The cultural context of patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duty: passive euthanasia and advance directives in Germany and Israel by Schicktanz, Silke et al.
SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION
The cultural context of patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duty:
passive euthanasia and advance directives in Germany and Israel
Silke Schicktanz • Aviad Raz • Carmel Shalev
Published online: 31 July 2010
  The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The moral discourse surrounding end-of-life
(EoL) decisions is highly complex, and a comparison of
Germany and Israel can highlight the impact of cultural
factors. The comparison shows interesting differences in
how patient’s autonomy and doctor’s duties are morally
and legally related to each other with respect to the with-
holding and withdrawing of medical treatment in EoL sit-
uations. Taking the statements of two national expert ethics
committees on EoL in Israel and Germany (and their legal
outcome) as an example of this discourse, we describe the
similarity of their recommendations and then focus on the
differences, including the balancing of ethical principles,
what is identiﬁed as a problem, what social role profes-
sionals play, and the inﬂuence of history and religion. The
comparison seems to show that Israel is more restrictive in
relation to Germany, in contrast with previous bioethical
studies in the context of the moral and legal discourse
regarding the beginning of life, in which Germany was
characterized as far more restrictive. We reﬂect on the
ambivalence of the cultural reasons for this difference and
its expression in various dissenting views on passive
euthanasia and advance directives, and conclude with a
comment on the difﬁculty in classifying either stance as
more or less restrictive.
Keywords Culture  End of life  Expert ethics
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Introduction
End-of-life (EoL) decisions concerning passive and active
euthanasia, or the handling of advance directives, are very
complex and closely linked to legal, medical, religious, and
bioethical discourses. In this paper
1 we examine and
deconstruct these linkages in Germany and Israel, moving
beyond one-dimensional constructions of ethical state-
ments as ‘‘social facts’’ to their conﬂicting and multi-fac-
eted embedding within professional, religious, and cultural
perspectives (Turner 2005).
Germany and Israel, both at the cutting edge of Western
medical progress, constitute opposing examples of profes-
sional culture in relation to biomedicine—especially in all
questions pertaining to reproductive and genetic technolo-
gies at the beginning of life. So far, bioethical comparisons
between Germany and Israel have generally shown
Germany to be more restrictive and Israel to be more
S. Schicktanz (&)
Department of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine,
University Medical Center Go ¨ttingen, Go ¨ttingen, Germany
e-mail: silke.schicktanz@medizin.uni-goettingen.de
A. Raz




Maria-Goeppert-Mayer guest professorship in 2008,
University Medical Center Go ¨ttingen, Go ¨ttingen, Germany
e-mail: cshalev@012.net.il
1 This paper is a very condensed but slightly revised version of a
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DOI 10.1007/s11019-010-9262-3permissive. Various studies have shown that German and
Israeli professionals such as genetic counsellors, bioethi-
cists and physicians differ strongly in their moral assess-
ment of various biomedical issues including pre-
implantation and prenatal genetic diagnosis, stem cell
research and issues of selective abortion (Wertz and
Fletcher 1989; Hashiloni-Dolev 2007; Gottweis and
Prainsack 2006). While all these studies have dealt with the
beginning of life, in this article we consider the other side
of the life-span, namely EoL decisions. We want to explore
whether the same moral opposition also characterizes EoL
ethics in the two countries.
The juxtaposition of Germany and Israel highlights the
context of cultural variation and pluralism in the moral
assessment and evaluation of EoL dilemmas. We focus
mainly on the variation in experts’ roles and physicians’
duties, as well as on the role of religion and the historical
factor of the Holocaust. The descriptive part of this study
presents an ethical analysis of the statements of two
national expert committees on EoL in Israel and Germany.
This analysis leads us to discuss the notion of restrictive
versus permissive bioethics, further embedding it in the
cultural context of assimilating medico-technical
developments.
Methods
Our bi-national analysis of the EoL ethics discourse focu-
ses on the ofﬁcial statements of two national expert com-
mittees in Israel and Germany. We analysed these
statements with a special focus on passive euthanasia and
advance directives (see for more details: Schicktanz et al.
2010) along the following research questions: (A) What are
the main ethical principles mentioned? (B) What are the
main problems identiﬁed? (C) What role do cultural and
historical factors play? By deconstructing each of the
statements and exposing their basic elements, which were
then compared cross-culturally, this methodology aimed at
uncovering the embedding of ethics within multi-faceted
and conﬂicting cultural narratives. In such manner we offer
a subversive analysis of ethical declarations as presenting
an illusion of being monolithic and consensual ‘social
facts’ (Haimes and Williams 2007).
We compare the Israeli Report of the Public Committee
on ‘‘The Care of Dying Patients’’ (2002) (the so called
Steinberg-Committee),
2 with the 2006 German National
Ethics Council (NEC) Opinion Report on ‘‘Self-determi-
nation and Care at the End of Life’’ (in the following
abbreviated as GE-Opinion-EoL), and the 2005 German
National Ethics Council’s Opinion Report on ‘‘Advance
directives (abbreviated as GE-Opinion-AD).
3 These two
national ethics committees were both found in a politically
powerful position. For the purpose of ethical analysis we
focus primarily on the original and full statement of the
respective committee, rather than on the latest version of
the law itself (although we refer also to the updated legal
situation), since the committees’ statements contain the
discussion of the premises and arguments underlying the
formulation of the law (see also Lepping 2007). A new
German law (from 1/9/09) (German Civil Code §1901a
Living wills as part of §1901 ‘Scope of custodianship/
duties of custodianship’) proclaims, as recommended by
the NEC (see below), that existing advance directives are
binding on attending physicians and strengthen the role of
proxies in EoL decisions. A rather short, but very contro-
versial parliamentary debate preceded this regulation. In
Israel, the Knesset enacted the Dying Patient Law in 2005,
based on the recommendations of the expert committee
report, which also addressed advance directives and proxy
decision-makers. However, in both countries many prac-
tical questions concerning the implementation of the laws
are still debated.
The German National Ethics Council was appointed by
the German Chancellor in 2001 with the general mandate
to discuss urgent bioethical issues and to advise the
Chancellor, the parliament and the public. The Israeli
committee was appointed by the Minister of Health in
2000, following a Supreme Court judgment calling for
legislation to clarify the matter of advance care planning,
with the speciﬁc mandate to formulate a comprehensive
legislative proposal on EoL medical care. Both committees
were comprised of an interdisciplinary membership. At the
time of its EoL report, the German Committee consisted of
25 members (professional philosophers, lawyers, medical
scientists, patient representatives, politicians and Catholic
and Protestant religious authorities) and chaired by the
lawyer and politician Christiane Weber-Hassemer. The
Israeli Committee consisted of 59 expert members, making
it the largest public committee ever established in Israel,
and was chaired by the paediatric neurologist and halakhic-
medical ethicist Avraham Steinberg (2006, p. 100). Both
national committees aimed for a formal consensus state-
ment which was achieved in the main part, but both also
offer some dissenting statements.
2 See an English translation published in Hurwitz et al. (2006).
3 English translation published by the German NEC is available at
http://www.nationalerethikrat.de/en_index.php.
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Legal backgrounds
In both countries, to the date of the reports no speciﬁc EoL
law existed. In Israel, there were Ministry of Health
guidelines (1996) and several court decisions that indicated
recognition of certain legal principles (e.g., the patient’s
right to refuse treatment, the prohibition of active eutha-
nasia, in dubio pro vitae) within the general frame of the
Patient’s Rights Law (1996) (Shalev 2000). However, there
was a lack of clarity as to the distinction between passive
and active euthanasia, and as to the effect of advance
directives. In Germany, there existed sections in the
criminal law which were relevant to EoL decisions, as well
as articles in the Constitution, such as Article 2(1), which
protects the right to free personal development, and Article
2(2), which protects the individual’s right to life and
physical integrity and had been construed to include
autonomous decisions in shaping the dying process.
However, there remained considerable legal questions
about the doctor’s position as a guarantor of life, and a
large degree of ambivalence as regards the doctor’s duties.
Main similarities and differences
The main recommendations in both expert committee
statements can be summarized with respect to their similar
articulation of the following ﬁve points:
• There is a duty to administer palliative care.
• There is a duty to administer basic care, which includes
hygiene, social care, and treatment to assuage feelings
of starving and of thirst.
• Killing on request (so-called active euthanasia) should
be legally forbidden. Both statements proclaim that no
doctors or other persons should be allowed to kill a
patient (e.g. by applying a deadly dose of a substance),
even on the patient’s explicit wish.
• In case of doubt or uncertainty about the patient’s wish,
a decision in favor of life ought to be made: In the
absence of an explicit statement or advance directive by
the patient, and if the relatives seem to be unclear or
contradictory as to the patient’s presumed wishes,
physicians and care givers should save life and not stop
life sustaining care.
• The role of advance directives has to be strengthened
and made legally binding.
At the same time, the two reports differ in some major
respects. The ﬁrst discrepancy concerns the moral accep-
tance of ‘letting die’ (a term suggested by the German NEC
to be used for ‘passive euthanasia’). In the German report a
strong consensus was expressed that ‘letting die’
encompasses both withholding and withdrawing medical
treatment, and the NEC supported it so long as it is in
accordance with the patient’s explicit wish. In contrast, the
Israeli report stood out from most international reports and
laws by stressing the signiﬁcance of the distinction
between interrupting (withdrawing) and refraining from
(withholding) medical treatment, because of psychological,
philosophical and religious (halakhic) reasons associated
with the former. Hence, the Steinberg Committee report
concluded that withholding or refraining from medical
treatment is morally acceptable if in accordance with the
patient’s explicit voiced wish; however, withdrawing or
interrupting continuous treatment such as artiﬁcial respi-
ration or artiﬁcial feeding is seen as morally unacceptable
even if the patient so wishes (see the more detailed dis-
cussion below).
The emerging role of advance directives
With respect to advance directives, the Israeli report
stressed the need to acknowledge the effect of advance
directives made by individuals after receiving relevant
medical information from medical caregivers, and recom-
mended that a national registry be established to facilitate
their actual implementation. The subsequent law contains
ofﬁcial statutory forms that include lists of multiple-choice
questions representing, for example, various speciﬁc tech-
niques of resuscitation, distinctions between ‘dying’ and
‘terminal’ patients, ‘treatment related to the ‘incurable
medical problem’ and ‘accompanying treatment’, and
‘continuous’ versus ‘cyclical’ treatment. They thus appear
to reduce the complex communication of EoL decisions to
a long list of medical procedures and formal legal language
that, arguably, alienates lay persons and makes them
dependent on lawyers and doctors, instead of empowering
them to make their own choices in their own words (Shalev
2009, 2010).
In Germany, the NEC recommended making advance
directives legally binding for physicians, care givers and
legal representatives (GE-Opinion-AD), but did not
address the practical problem of implementing advance
directives in medical practice. The recent German law was
the result of a heated parliamentary debate in which at least
four different motions were discussed. The law gives legal
effect to advance directives while other issues of EoL
decisions are not explicitly regulated. Furthermore, the law
stresses the role of proxies which should ensure that doc-
tors are following the patient’s wishes as expressed in the
AD: Hence, ADs have to be written documents, but neither
a doctor’s information nor a notarial act is required. No
national registry for AD is foreseen. While the advance
directive form issued by the German Federal Ministry of
Justice is similarly loaded with medico-legal jargon, there
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including those issued by the churches and by patient
support organizations, which range in style from the formal
to the informal. Nonetheless, only very few Germans have
an advance directive.
4
Cultural diversity of moral key elements
Balancing various, sometime opposing values seems to be
the key element in EoL decisions, according to both
committees’ statements. Value balancing entails a twofold
problem: First, one has to justify the main ethical princi-
ples; secondly, some hierarchy between the principles has
to be considered. In the Israeli report, four main ethical
principles were mentioned: sanctity of life, prevention of
signiﬁcant suffering, quality of life, and patient autonomy.
On the other hand, the German report referred to self-
determination and protecting bodily integrity as part of
patient autonomy, then to protection of life, and solidarity
with vulnerable persons.
The place of patient autonomy in the order of the ethical
principles seems to be of signiﬁcance, as well as the Ger-
man report reference to ‘protection of life’, as opposed to
‘sanctity of life’, which has a less religious and less
absolute connotation. Indeed, the German committee
understood the right of self-determination to be ‘‘the’’ ethos
of contemporary life. In contrast, the Israeli report started
with a general presumption that autonomy, as ‘‘a’’ demo-
cratic value, has to be balanced with Jewish religious
values—of which ‘sanctity of life’ is the most important.
This can be seen in the (non-liberal, socially prescriptive)
recommendation of the Israeli committee that caregivers
have a duty to persuade patients to accept oxygen, food,
drink and regular medicine, and that they may not with-
draw ongoing medical treatment (Steinberg-Report 2006,
p. 221). Similarly, the Israeli law adopted the committee’s
recommendation that doctors must administer artiﬁcial
feeding and ﬂuids even if the patient made advance
directives to the contrary.
Handling conﬂicts in EoL situations
The role of experts represents a key element in both
committees. The Israeli report delegated the responsibility
for conﬂict resolution to medical and health care experts,
and the Dying Patient Law established institutional ethics
expert committees with the power to make decisions if
there is a conﬂict between the involved parties. These
committees must take into account the patient’s wishes
according to his/her world view and life-style (see also:
Steinberg Report 2006, p. 232). But in the case of unre-
solved dissent in the institutional ethics committee, a
national committee is authorized to decide.
Concerning the same issue, a debate developed in the
German committee. Its general report on EoL care
remained imprecise regarding who should decide in a sit-
uation of conﬂict: the physician, the patient, or the state;
yet the answer can be found in the earlier report on advance
directives: ‘‘in the event of conﬂict—in particular con-
cerning the interpretation of the advance directive—the
Court of Guardianship should decide.’’ (GE-Opinion-AD,
p. 57). The recent law took up this approach by providing
that the Court of Guardianship has jurisdiction to make
decisions when there are conﬂicts between physician and
proxy with regard to life-shortening decisions.
The cultural assessment of experts’ responsibility is
hence quite different: While in Israel health care experts
are seen as best equipped to solve EoL dilemmas, in
Germany the power to do so is put in the hands of legal
experts. This is reﬂected also in the expertise of the two
heads of the respective committees: in Germany, a lawyer–
philosopher; in Israel a physician–cleric.
Passive euthanasia
The debate on the morality of active and passive eutha-
nasia, or the distinction between withholding and with-
drawing treatment, (passive and active ‘‘letting die’’) was
a matter of ﬁerce controversy in the international bio-
ethics community, especially until the mid-1990s (see
Callahan 1989; Nordcross and Steinbock 1994; overview
by Howard-Snyder 2007). Nowadays, however, most
international statements agree that there is no substantial
moral or legal distinction between withholding and
withdrawing, because of consequentialist and intentional
considerations. Correspondingly, the German Report
emphasized that there is no morally relevant distinction
between the cessation of a continuing medical treatment
as opposed to not administering it in the ﬁrst place (GE-
Opinion-EoL, p. 46). The examples mentioned are arti-
ﬁcial feeding and respiration. The report concluded that
the morally relevant action is to omit an unwanted
treatment (p. 47), although it acknowledged that it is
‘‘psychologically understandable if the doctor … is more
reluctant to intervene actively—by removing a feeding
tube or turning off a respirator—than simply do nothing.’’
(ibid. p. 47).
It concluded that in both cases the intention (stopping an
unwanted treatment) and the outcome (death) of the action
are what count morally. Therefore, the distinction between
4 According to several studies the numbers vary between 10–20%.
(e.g. Lang and Wagner 2007; Justinger et al. 2009).
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tiﬁed from a moral point of view.
5
In contrast, the moral distinction between withholding
and withdrawing treatment played an important role in the
Israeli report. The argument for such a distinction is
explained by the Chair Steinberg (2006, p. 103):
‘‘According to relevant halakhic principles and the actual
rulings of these prominent rabbis, preserving life is one of
the most important values. Any act that shortens life is
halakhically considered as murder, even at the very end of
life (…). Therefore, active euthanasia, physician-assisted
suicide or the withdrawal of a continuous treatment such as
a pacemaker or a respirator is absolutely forbidden’’
(emphasis added).
However, this position was criticised by various (secular)
ethicists and lawyers in the Israeli committee as unethical,
and inconsistent with the previous case law. Judges, legal
scholars and philosophers maintained that there was no
logical difference between withholding and withdrawing
treatment, in accordance with the international agreement.
From a patient rights perspective, it was argued that just as
informed consent is required before the administration of
medical treatment, so too treatment may not be continued
against the will of the patient, since in both cases the forced
treatment is a violation of the right to bodily integrity and
amounts technically to assault. Moreover, a rule forbidding
the withdrawal of ‘‘continuous’’ treatment at the patient’s
request might be detrimental, because it could induce a
patient to forgo potentially beneﬁcial treatment out of fear
that once it is begun it cannot be stopped. In addition,
artiﬁcial respiration is often initiated as a matter of course in
conditions of medical emergency, where the patient does
not have a real option to indicate consent due to the cir-
cumstances. The rule of ﬁrst treating and then asking
questions in emergencies is entirely appropriate, but if
discontinuation of treatment is not allowed, patients can
ﬁnd themselves held captive by life-prolonging measures
which they might have preferred to refuse. (Shalev 2009).
The Steinberg Committee proposed a technological
solution, in order to ameliorate its position that withdrawal
of treatment should not be permitted, and to reach a con-
sensus between the secular and religious camps of the
committee. It invoked a novel distinction between ‘con-
tinuous’ and ‘discontinuous/serial’ treatment, based on the
idea that medical treatment can be seen as one ‘‘act’’ or as a
sequence of acts. For example, the administration of dial-
ysis is seen as a sequence of single, equivalent acts, while
artiﬁcial respiration over several months is seen as only one
act. However, if a timer would be installed on a respiratory
machine, so that it automatically switches off the respirator
after a set period of time and has to be intentionally turned
on by someone again, the treatment would then be con-
sidered as discontinuous. The resetting of the clock would
be routine care unless the patient explicitly expresses her
wish not to turn it on again.
At the same time, some critics questioned the merit of
this idea. Such a technology may be very useful for over-
coming the understandable reluctance of a doctor to ‘‘pull
the plug,’’ but it raises various questions. For example, if it
is morally wrong to discontinue life support, what differ-
ence does it make how we perform the act? Can a change
of technique make right of something that is wrong?
(Ravitsky 2006).
Historical factors
In the German EoL debate, the spectre of the ‘‘Nazi doc-
tors’’ played a signiﬁcant argumentative role (see for
example Schmuhl 2000; Ach and Gaidt 2000; Kro ¨ner
2001). Because of this, there are still special sensitivities
around the use of the term ‘euthanasia’ in Germany and
therefore the German NEC introduced the term ‘criminal
euthanasia’ (2006) to distinguish the murders of disabled
persons during Nazi times as a separate category under the
more general label of ‘euthanasia’. In the Israeli debate, the
term of ‘mercy killing’ does not carry the same sensitivity.
Similar historical considerations came up in the German
NEC, when its members discussed the ethical and social
dimensions of killing on request (active euthanasia). Those
members of the NEC who considered it to be ethically
acceptable in principle (GE-Opinion-EoL p. 86f) never-
theless supported the recommendation that it should be
legally forbidden because of political considerations. These
considerations might be interpreted as taking historical
responsibility for criminal euthanasia practiced under the
Nazi regime—an argument explicitly mentioned by mem-
bers of the NEC. In the Israeli report we cannot ﬁnd any
comparable expression or reference.
Religious factors
The Israeli view on EoL care appears to be restrictive in
contrast to its general permissiveness on reproductive and
genetic issues at the beginning of life. This contrast
between the beginning and end of life could be explained
by the ‘two-fold’ view of Israeli society (Raz 2004). In
Israel the perception is that there is a gradual development
of moral status from the pre-born (partial moral status of
the embryo) to the already-born (full moral status), while in
Germany full moral status is already attributed to the
human embryo from the moment of conception. These
different perspectives reﬂect the variance between religious
views in Judaism and Christianity.
5 The very recent decision of the German Federal Court of Justice
conﬁrmed this view (no. 129/10 on 25th June 2010).
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that ‘sanctity of life’ is seen as the highest religious
(Jewish) ethical principle (Glick 1999; Green 1999; Ganz
et al. 2006; Rosner 1999). Interestingly, Jewish ethics
scholars such as Leonard Kravitz (2006) claim that the
statements in the Steinberg committee’s report do not
present any universalistic position of Jewish thinking
(especially with respect to the proscription of withdrawing
treatment).
In the German debate, too, the religious impact should
not be underestimated. Christian authorities refer similarly
to the sanctity of life and the moral unacceptability of
terminating human life, seen as a gift from God (GE-
Opinion-EoL p. 75). However, the religious position is
presented as one voice among many others, in a concert of
pluralistic discourse. National surveys overall showed that
a majority of the German population is actually in favour of
active euthanasia (GE-opinion-EOL 2006). Future studies
could examine if the German objection to active euthana-
sia, as expressed by politicians as well as most experts, is
due to continuing loyalties to the two Christian churches.
6
Conclusions
In contrast to its general permissiveness in the beginning-
of-life discourse, the Israeli view on EoL appears to be
much more restrictive than the German view. The Israeli
stance concerning passive euthanasia seems more restric-
tive because of three reasons: (a) doctors must persuade
patients to accept life-supporting medical treatment; (b)
doctors may not respect a competent patient’s expressed
wishes to withdraw continuous life-supporting treatment,
and (c) doctors may not respect an incompetent patient’s
advance directives to withhold artiﬁcial feeding.
Thus the contrast between German and Israeli perspec-
tives of EoL care can be seen to represent different social
conceptions of the doctor’s duty vis-a `-vis the balancing of
the sanctity of life versus individual self-determination.
The German emphasis is on the doctors’ duty to respect the
patient’s autonomy, while the Israeli focus is on the doc-
tors’ duty to respect the sanctity of life.
But we would like to reﬁne our own generalization by
offering a more differentiated understanding of the term
‘‘restrictive.’’ Considering Israel’s practical solution of the
timer, one could ask whether this is still considered
‘‘restrictive’’. The answer to that question depends inter
alia on who will have the power to decide whether the
timer is set up again—the patient (Barilan 2004) or the
physicians and caregivers (as the committee has sug-
gested). And although the technical solution of the timer
was regarded by some authors as a ﬁg leaf for a moral
conundrum or even a ‘sell-out’ (Butcher 2005; Ravitsky
2005), one could see it instead as a pragmatic way out of a
value-laden conﬂict that enables individual solutions. In
terms of Israeli culture, such pragmatism has been shown
to serve as a main cultural interface between Jewish tra-
dition and secular modernism (Gross and Ravitsky 2003;
Shapira 2006).
The taken-for-granted German predilection for protect-
ing individual autonomy should be reviewed in light of the
German debate on advance directives. While the Steinberg
committee recommended increasing the relevance and
binding character of advance directives, the call of the
German NEC in favour of strengthening advance directives
was criticized by other interdisciplinary ethics committees,
such as the German Interim Parliament Commission for
Ethics and Law of Modern Medicine (Enquete-Komission
2002). Likewise, the recent German legal solution of del-
egating decisions to judges in cases of conﬂicts between
proxies and doctors can be interpreted as (partly) restricting
patients’ autonomy. These nuances illustrate how the
German EoL legal policy is also restrictive in certain
respects, just as the Israeli EoL law also has some per-
missive aspects.
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